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ATTORNEYS’ FEES INCURRED IN
DEFENDING INSURANCE POLICY
NON-COVERED CLAIMS: WHO PAYS?
Joseph F. Cunningham with James N. Markels*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the U.S. property/casualty insurance industry generated
$437,709,106.00 in net premiums written.1 Of the top ten U.S. carriers,
nearly all had created in-house law firms in metropolitan areas to lessen the
claims-handling/litigation costs so paramount an element of their business
costs.2 Indeed, it is difficult to name another commercial enterprise that
devotes so much money to payment of attorneys’ fees.3 At the same time,
commentators on the legal profession have indicated that moneymaking has
become the profession’s “driving issue . . ., the driving goal”4 and that the
emphasis has become the “priority” of moneymaking.5
Given this growing tension between the interests of insurers and their
insureds, it is surprising that relatively little scholarly or academic work has
addressed the significant issue of whether or not insurers are entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees and costs expended by them when defending cases
that involve factual allegations that fall outside the terms and conditions of
their insureds’ policies. The lack of critical regard for this topic cannot be
rationalized by concluding only insignificant sums of money are involved,
because many disputes between insurer and insured over the obligation to
pay defense counsel involve millions of dollars.6
With this somewhat odd indifference by parties to this far-reaching
legal and business issue, it is appropriate to look at the major cases on this
* Joseph F. Cunningham is the owner of Cunningham & Associates, PLC, an insurance defense law firm in Arlington, Virginia. James N. Markels was previously an associate with Cunningham & Associates, PLC.
1. Net Premiums Written, Top Property/Casualty Writers, United States—2005, 107 BEST’S
REVIEW 55, 55–56 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Rodd Zolkos, Ward Identifies What Makes Some Insurers a Cut Above, BUS.
INS., Aug. 21, 2000, http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/article.pl?articleId=2243.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 95 (2005) (reporting that in
the expensive field of asbestos litigation, “defense legal fees and expenses consumed more than
$21 billion, about 31 percent of the funds spent by defendants and insurers on asbestos personal
injury claims through 2002”).
4. Kathryn Alfisi, Books in the Law: A Conversation with Joseph Goulden, WASH. LAW.,
June 2006, at 38, 39.
5. Joseph E. Ulrich, The Business of Law Practice Is Business, 18 J. CIV. LITIG. 29, 29–30
(2006).
6. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 95–96 (reporting that the $21 billion spent on
defense legal fees and expenses in asbestos litigation was partially caused by insurers and insureds
disputing coverage issues).
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topic from the past few years. Case law is not abundant on this topic. But
those jurisdictions—both state and federal—that have addressed the issue
have done so in depth; with a polar disparity of opinion by a number of
well-regarded courts.
Part II of this article will analyze major cases that do not recognize the
insurer’s right to recovery. Part III will analyze major cases that do
recognize the insurer’s right to recovery. Finally, Part IV will compare the
two different ways courts treat this issue and conclude that the rule
recognizing the insurer’s right to recovery is the better rule.
II. MAJOR CASE LAW NOT RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO
RECOVERY
A. FOURTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETING MARYLAND LAW
In Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America,7
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, interpreting Maryland law
under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 recently tackled the issue of carrier
entitlement to defense fees/costs. The insurer had paid out defense costs for
both covered and uncovered claims, but then sought to recover the costs of
defending the uncovered claims.9 The court decided that allowing such
partial recovery would “significantly tip the scales in favor of the insurer,”10
and cause liability insurance to “all but cease to function,”11 turning it
instead into an “up-front defense whose line-item costs would then be the
subject of subsequent litigation.”12
This chamber-of-horrors argument is a bit extreme, given the broad
obligation of an insurer in Maryland, and elsewhere, to fully defend both
the covered and non-covered claims once a duty to indemnify potentially
exists.13 This principle of great benefit to the insured, coupled with the basic
premise that an insurance policy is a contract whose particular language
alone governs the duties and benefits conferred on both parties,14 plus the
court’s silence on the insurer’s right to ultimate restitution for non-covered
claim defense, suggest an insured’s potential windfall.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2006).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Perdue Farms, 448 F.3d at 254.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery County Bd. of Ed. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 840 A.2d 220, 226 (Md. App.
2003); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 746 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. App. 2000).
14. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 25
(2003) (noting that “the relationship between insurers and policyholders remains largely the
province of contract law”).
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The Perdue Farms panel gave little deference to any of these concepts.
The opinion’s author, Judge James Harvie Wilkinson III, is known as a
particularly conservative judge on a very business-friendly, conservative
court.15 Therefore, the adoption of an industry-hostile, rigidly exclusionary
rule in this case, buttressed by relatively banal generalities, appears odd.
This is especially true, given an absence of controlling Maryland law on
point and the case facts.
The insured, Perdue, held a policy issued by Travelers to cover claims
based upon violations of the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).16 The plaintiff in the underlying class action alleged ERISA
as well as wage- and hour-law violations.17 Wage and hour claims were not
covered under the Travelers policy. Nevertheless, the bulk of the allegations
of wrongdoing related to such issues, and the bulk of the $10 million
settlement of the case and $4.4 million in defense costs were attributable to
those non-covered items.18 The court reversed the district court’s decision to
have Travelers pay all settlement costs involving all claims made, reasoning
correctly that the policy clearly did not respond to non-covered events. But
it followed what has been termed the minority rule19 by rejecting
application of this analysis to the attorneys’ fees and costs expended to
defend such extra-policy claims.20 To bolster its reasoning that settlementindemnification costs should not be borne entirely by Travelers, the court
stated that to do otherwise, “would turn the insurance policy on its head
[and] . . . impose liability upon Travelers for claims that its insurance policy
never covered.”21
It is puzzling that the court thought it was appropriate to split the
settlement costs, with the insurer paying the costs for the covered claims
and the insured paying the costs for the uncovered claims, but found this
same reasoning did not apply to splitting the attorneys’ fees/costs. This
seems especially odd, given the need for lower-court involvement in any
necessary apportioning of covered and non-covered dollar amounts
comprising the settlement.22 Furthermore, Travelers had earlier put Perdue
15. Neil A. Lewis, In List of Potential Justices, Many Kinds of Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2005, at A13 (characterizing Judge Wilkinson and his 4th Circuit colleague Judge J. Michael
Luttig as “indisputably conservatives”); Anna Palmer, Conservatives Fear 4th Circuit Is Slipping
Away, LAW.COM, July 10, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1183712793303 (stating
that the 4th Circuit “has long been a bastion of conservative rulings”).
16. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2007); Perdue
Farms, 448 F.3d at 254.
17. Perdue Farms, 448 F.3d at 255.
18. Id. at 254.
19. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallerich, No. 07-2145, 2007 WL 2821656, at *9 (D.
Minn. Sept. 25, 2007) (referring to the rule embraced here as “the minority rule”).
20. Perdue Farms, 448 F.3d at 258.
21. Id. at 262.
22. Id. at 264.
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on notice: upon receipt of the underlying lawsuit from its insured, Travelers
warned Perdue that it was reserving its rights under the policy as to both
fees/costs and indemnification obligations. Travelers further stated that it
intended to seek recovery of defense costs expended on non-covered claims
defense.23
B. ILLINOIS LAW
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Illinois embraced the same minority
view as Maryland. In General Agents Insurance Co. of America v. Midwest
Sporting Goods Co., it reversed the Circuit and lower appellate courts,
which had held an insurer was entitled to reimbursement of attorneys’ fees
for defending a no-coverage case.24 The underlying case was brought by the
City of Chicago and Cook County against the insured for selling guns to
inappropriate purchasers and alleged intentional wrongdoing and other noncovered acts. The City sought injunctive relief and punitive damages.25
Nonetheless, a defense was provided under a reservation of rights that
included the right to seek repayment of defense costs for non-covered
claims.
But the Illinois Supreme Court, while recognizing the majority of
jurisdictions permit such recovery,26 cited current Wyoming and Texas
Supreme Court decisions that did not.27 Both of those courts held that the
absence of policy language permitting the insurer to recoup defense costs
was fatal to the carrier’s subsequent effort to recover them, despite its
articulated reservation of rights to do so if appropriate.28 The Illinois court
adopted this reasoning on the premise that to do otherwise would allow the
insurer to “unilaterally modify its contract.”29 It went on to cite with
approval Terra Nova Insurance Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc.30 and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp.31 While the latter case, in rejecting
the insurer’s claim for reimbursement, provided no thoughtful analysis,32
the Third Circuit’s opinion provides interesting reasoning:

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 255.
Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 2005).
Id. at 1093–1094.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1101 (citing Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510 (Wyo.
2000) and Tex. Ass’n of Counties County Govt. Risk Mgt. Pool v. Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d
128 (Tex. 2000)).
28. Shoshone, 2 P.3d at 517; Tex. Ass’n of Counties, 52 S.W.3d at 136.
29. Gen. Agents, 828 N.E.2d at 1102.
30. Id. (citing Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1989)).
31. Gen. Agents, 828 N.E.2d at 1103–04 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp.,
153 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 1998)).
32. Liberty Mut., 153 F.3d at 924.
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A rule permitting such recovery would be inconsistent with the legal
principles that induce an insurer’s offer to defend under [a] reservation of
rights. Faced with uncertainty as to its duty to indemnify, an insurer offers
a defense under reservation of rights to avoid the risks that an inept or
lackadaisical defense of the underlying action may expose it to if it turns
out there is a duty to indemnify.33

The Illinois Supreme Court found this reasoning persuasive.34
Practitioners know that it is speculative at best and removed from reality
otherwise. In many cases the insurer who reserves its rights still undertakes
to defend with counsel of its own choosing.35 The insurance defense bar has
been accused of many things over the decades, but “inept or lackadaisical”36
is not a known label. Surely, chosen defense counsel would not be used
more than once if it exhibited such traits. For that matter, any counsel who
fail to vigorously represent their clients put their clients at risk and expose
themselves to malpractice claims.37 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit in
Perdue Farms also quoted this dubious reasoning.38
The Illinois court also reasoned that implying an agreement to permit
the insurer to recover attorneys’ fees for non-covered claims defense
“places the insured in the position of making a Hobson’s choice between
accepting the insurer’s additional conditions on its defense or losing its
right to a defense from the insurer.”39
This straw man of a Hobson’s choice is not in accord with practice.
Insurers generally do not pull coverage if an insured or its attorney disputes
the content of a reservation-of-rights letter.40 To do so puts the carrier at
risk of paying all personal-counsel fees/costs for defending the underlying
33. Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1219.
34. Gen. Agents, 828 N.E.2d at 1103.
35. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 748 F.Supp. 1223, 1228 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (holding that although the insurer reserved its rights under the policy, the insured
“was not entitled to insist on counsel of its choice at [the insurer’s] expense”); L & S Roofing
Supply Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 521 So.2d 1298, 1304 (Ala. 1988) (“The mere
fact that the insurer chooses to defend its insured under a reservation of rights does not ipso facto
constitute such a conflict of interest that the insured is entitled at the outset to engage defense
counsel of its choice at the expense of the insurer.”).
36. Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1219.
37. See, e.g., Am. Guar. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Timothy S. Keiter, P.A., 360 F.3d 13, 15 (1st
Cir. 2004); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1996);
Fein ex rel. Estate of Fein v. Chicago Ins. Co., No. 01 Civ. 11386, 2003 WL 21688239, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2003).
38. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 252, 259 (4th Cir. 2006).
39. Gen. Agents, 828 N.E.2d at 1102.
40. Instead of pulling coverage, an insurer that disputes coverage with its insured would more
likely file suit for a declaratory judgment for its responsibilities under the policy. See, e.g., Transp.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Soil Tech Distrib., Inc., No. 4D06-1483, 2007 WL 2254551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 8, 2007), where the insurer defended under a reservation of rights and then filed suit for
declaratory judgment to determine whether it owed either a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify
to the insured.
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suit and the insured’s prosecuting the subsequent coverage action, as well
as a potential bad-faith claim.41 Such a course comports with no reasonable
risk/reward analysis. Its erroneous premise hardly provides a reasoned basis
for precluding the insurer from attempting to recover attorneys fees
unrelated to covered claims.
III. MAJOR CASE LAW RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO
RECOVERY
A. CALIFORNIA LAW
Less than a year before the Perdue Farms decision, the Supreme Court
of California reached the opposite decision of the Perdue Farms court in
Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. M.V. Transportation.42 The facts in Scottsdale
were similar to those in Perdue Farms. The insured, M.V. Transportation,
was sued by a competitor alleging contractual breaches, unlawful business
actions, misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition in the
underlying case. None of these acts were covered by the Scottsdale policy.43
Although the carrier did not believe the claims were covered by the policy’s
“advertising injury” provisions, the carrier nevertheless provided a defense
because of the possibility of coverage, and advised in its reservation-ofrights letter that it would seek reimbursement of defense fees for causes of
action raising no potential for coverage.44
The trial court in Scottsdale’s declaratory judgment action found a duty
to defend and no right to reimbursement.45 An intermediate appellate court
affirmed, but the California Supreme Court reversed.46 As in Perdue Farms,
California law obligated the carrier to defend all claims if any involved are
covered.47 The court referenced the very broad existing case language that a
potential for coverage is all that is required, and

41. See, e.g., Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 684 (Fla. 2000) (“Florida law is clear
that in ‘any dispute’ which leads to judgment against the insurer and in favor of the insured,
attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the insured.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4102 (1999) (stating
that in the context of property insurance, “[t]he court upon rendering judgment against any insurer
. . . shall allow the plaintiff a reasonable sum as attorney’s fees to be taxed as part of the costs”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-15(b.1) (2000) (stating in the context of motor vehicle liability insurance
“[i]n the event the insurer denies coverage and it is determined by declaratory judgment or other
civil process that there is in fact coverage, the insurer shall be liable to the insured for legal cost
and attorney’s fees as may be awarded by the court”).
42. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. M.V. Transp., 115 P.3d 460 (Cal. 2005).
43. Id. at 463. Most other commercial general liability policies do not cover such acts either.
See BAKER, supra note 14, at 417 (reproducing a sample commercial general liability policy).
44. Scottsdale, 115 P.3d at 467.
45. Id. at 464.
46. Id. at 465.
47. Id. at 466.
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[m]oreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the . . . complaint
may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend
where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable or otherwise known,
the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability.48

Under California law, a duty to defend exists until extinguished by case
resolution or declaratory judgment, and the right to reimbursement was
believed to be restricted to prospective costs only.49 On a prior remand the
intermediate appellate court determined the carrier was entitled to
attorneys’ fees only prospectively, because prior decisions by the court had
found an obligation to defend, if not pay.50 The California Supreme Court
rejected this analysis and concluded that as no coverage existed for any
claim, the carrier was entitled to reimbursement ab initio.51
The court’s rationale is worth considering:
The insured pays for, and can reasonably expect, a defense against third
party claims that are potentially covered by its policy, but no more.
Conversely, the insurer does not bargain to assume the cost of defense of
claims that are not even potentially covered. To shift these costs to the
insured does not upset the contractual arrangement between the parties.
Thus, where the insurer, acting under a reservation of rights, has
prophylactically financed the defense of claims as to which it owed no
duty of defense, it is entitled to restitution. Otherwise, the insured, who did
not bargain for a defense of non-covered claims, would receive a windfall
and would be unjustly enriched.52

The Fourth Circuit decision in Perdue Farms failed to either cite this case
or reference the reasoning expressed. Common sense supports the
Scottsdale court’s point that:
Without a right of reimbursement, an insurer might be tempted to refuse to
defend an action in any part—especially an action with many claims that
are not even potentially covered and only a few that are—lest the insurer
give, and the insured get, more than they agreed.53

48. Id. (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) and CNA Cas. of Cal. v.
Seaboard Sur. Co., 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1986)).
49. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993); Haskel Inc. v.
Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520 (1995); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Superior Court,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1994).
50. Scottsdale, 115 P.3d at 469–470.
51. Id. at 471.
52. Id. at 469.
53. Id. at 470.
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B. SIXTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETING OHIO LAW
In United National Insurance Co. v. SST Fitness Corp.,54 the Sixth
Circuit, interpreting Ohio law, concluded that attorneys’ fees were
recoverable by the insurer after defense of uncovered claims related to
patent and trademark infringement. It distinguished both the Wyoming55
and Third Circuit56 opinions as predicated on imprecise or untimely
reservations of rights and followed the majority rule.58 The court thus
limited its holding to cases, “where the insurer: 1) timely and explicitly
reserves its rights to recoup . . . costs, and 2) provides specific and adequate
notice of the possibility of reimbursement.”59 As the insured did not contest
the carrier’s specific notice of intent to recover fees/costs for uncovered
claims, the court concluded an implied-in-fact contract between the parties
existed, permitting recovery.60 If the insured rejects this conditional
defense, the court indicated the insured could proceed by itself with
personal counsel defense of the underlying dispute, or file a declaratory
judgment action.61
This appears too harsh and the conclusion is unrelated to reality.
Experience indicates insureds will do neither and need not! The issue can be
resolved when the third-party claim is settled or adjudicated. The alternative
courses put all expense that appears to be extra-contractual and unnecessary
on the insured. Yet the Sixth Circuit’s underlying conclusion that a carrier
should not be required to pay for the defense of uncovered claims is
basically correct if adequate notice is given the insured.
C. FLORIDA LAW
A Florida Court of Appeals decision in Colony Insurance Co. v. G&E
Tires & Service, Inc.62 approved reimbursement to a carrier for defending
non-covered sexual discrimination claims under the insured’s garage
owners’ policy which specifically excluded such a risk. It pointed out that a
“duty to defend does not create coverage where coverage does not exist.”63
The carrier filed a declaratory judgment action on the coverage issue and
prevailed.64 The Florida appellate court then correctly concluded that the
insurer was not entitled to fee reimbursement for its defense of partially
54.
55.
56.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., 309 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2002).
Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510 (Wyo. 2000).
Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1989).
United Nat’l Ins. Co., 309 F.3d at 918–919.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921.
Colony Ins. Co. v. G & E Tires & Serv., Inc., 777 So.2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1038.
Id.
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covered claims.65 But, for those claims clearly and entirely not covered,
reimbursement was appropriate. The court relied on the policy language and
said:
With regard to defense costs for these claims, the insurer has not been paid
premiums by the insured. . . . To attempt to shift them would not upset the
arrangement. The insurer therefore has a right of reimbursement that is
implied in law as quasi-contractual, whether or not it has one that is
implied in fact in the policy as contractual.66

Perhaps more pertinently, it reasoned:
The courts should be consistent in encouraging insurance companies to
properly meet their duty to defend [their] insured[s] against third party
claims and minimize unnecessary claims to enforce policy coverage.
However, where an insurer has properly met its duty and subsequently
successfully challenges policy coverage, it should be entitled to the full
benefit of such a challenge and be reimbursed for the benefits it bestowed,
in good faith, to its insured.67

Years of experience on both sides of coverage litigation confirms this
position is sound.
D. CALIFORNIA LAW: “MIXED CLAIMS”
The above landmark cases, except for Perdue Farms,68 involved
instances when an absence of coverage appeared to exist as to all claims.69
Consequently, our survey closes with a review of another “mixed claims”
circumstance addressed by a prominent court. In Buss v. The Superior
Court,70 the California Supreme Court decided an insurer was entitled to
reimbursement of defense costs as to those claims not covered under its
policy, as opposed to those potentially covered, on a theory of implied-inlaw or quasi-contract recovery. It found that an “enrichment” of the insured
by the insurer through the bearing of unbargained-for defense costs is
inconsistent with the insurer’s duty under the policy and therefore

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1039 (quoting Knapp v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1169,
1172 (D. Minn. 1996)).
68. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“The parties agree that the policy covers claims for relief under ERISA, but that it does not
extend to claims for violations of wage and hour laws.”).
69. See also Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510, 514 (Wyo. 2000)
(“Pacific acknowledged that the coverage of its policy extended to the claim for invasion of
privacy because, at least potentially, that claim would qualify under the ‘personal injury’
coverage. . . . Pacific contends that it is responsible for those defense costs attributable to the
claim for invasion of privacy only.”).
70. Buss v. The Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
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“unjust.”71 It correctly placed the burden of proof on the insurer by a
preponderance of the evidence to show the proper allocation.72 The opinion
is thorough and detailed; written by the generally liberal Justice Mosk.
The Buss case involved some twenty-seven (27) claims, with the notunusual mix of some covered and some non-covered allegations.73 It
presents the most realistic scenario or real-world circumstances facing
claims professionals and attorneys for both sides. Unlike most such cases,
however, given California law on potential conflicts of interest when
coverage issues arise, the carrier initially agreed to—and did—pay for
personal counsel for the insured’s defense.74 The case settled ultimately for
$8.5 million with attorneys’ fees in excess of $1 million.75
The trial and intermediate appellate courts found that the insurer was
entitled to reimbursement of defense costs as to those claims not covered
under its policy.76 In affirming, Justice Mosk, in an exhaustive recitation of
California case law, made the wise point that the insurer has a duty to
defend all claims if some are covered in a typically “mixed” scenario, but
with a potential for repayment as to some:
[W]e can, and do, justify the insurer’s duty to defend the entire “mixed”
action prophylactically, as an obligation imposed by law in support of the
policy. To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. To
defend immediately, it must defend entirely. It cannot parse the claims,
dividing those that are at least potentially covered from those that are not.
. . . The “plasticity of modern pleading” allows the transformation of
claims that are at least potentially covered into claims that are not, and
vice versa. The fact remains: As to the claims that are at least potentially
covered, the insurer gives, and the insured gets, just what they bargained
for, namely, the mounting and funding of a defense. But as to the claims
that are not, the insurer may give, and the insured may get, more than they
agreed, depending on whether defense of these claims necessitates any
additional costs.77

The court went on to point out that without the right to ultimately seek
some reimbursement of extended costs in defending non-covered claims, an
insurer might risk not defending any claims. Given a fair chance at some
recovery, however, the economic risk of defending decreases;
consequentially the instinct to “refuse to defend an action in any part” also

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 769.
See San Diego Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
Buss, 939 P.2d at 770.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 775 (internal citations omitted).

2007] Attorney Fees Incurred in Defending Non-Covered Claims

79

decreases.78 Justice Mosk recognized the economic motive prevalent in
such disputes:
It is as to defense costs that can be allocated solely to the claims that are
not even potentially covered that the insurer has not been paid premiums
by the insured. By contrast, the insurer has in fact been paid as to costs
that can be allocated solely to the claims that are at least potentially
covered.79

The court’s decision brims with very sound, elemental reasoning and
balances what is fair to both the insurer and the insured.
IV. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
It is apparent the law governing the obligation of insurer and/or insured
to pay attorneys’ fees in insurance policy coverage defenses will continue to
develop without much consistency. The significant choices and issues
presented remain to be resolved in most jurisdictions. A cautious
application of the majority rule, as articulated by the California and Florida
courts,80 is the better-balanced approach. However, the more absolutist
denial of fees to insurers under any circumstances, as seen in Perdue Farms
and the other court decisions adhering to the minority position,81 provides
the virtue of simplicity. But this simplicity comes at a steep price.
Practically, denial of attorneys’ fees to a carrier for defending uncovered
claims encourages an insurer to refuse to defend the insured on borderline
cases in order to minimize costs, often with the insured either financially
unable or otherwise unwilling to contest such a decision.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 778.
Id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.

